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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
John Doe is a medical student who has multiple 
sclerosis. The National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME) 
provided testing accommodations to Doe when he took Step 
1 and Step 2 of the United States Medical Licensing 
Examination (USMLE), as it concedes it is required to do 
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under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
("ADA"), Pub.L. 101-336, Title III, 42 U.S.C.S 12181 et seq. 
(19__). The accommodations provided included extra time to 
complete each examination. The NBME annotates the 
scores of examinees who receive testing accommodations if, 
in its judgment, the accommodations affect the 
comparability of the accommodated score to non- 
accommodated scores. The NBME follows this practice 
because it believes that it owes a duty of candor to the 
users of USMLE scores to disclose factors that may affect 
the meaning of an examinee's scores. Although the USMLE 
was designed as a licensing examination, at the request of 
examinees, the NBME will send Step 1 and Step 2 scores to 
hospitals sponsoring residency and internship programs for 
use in evaluating candidates for admission to their 
programs. Examinees typically make such requests. Doe 
claims that, as applied to him, the NBME's practice of 
flagging accommodated scores violates Title III of the ADA. 
 
Doe is currently in the process of applying for residencies 
and internships in physical medicine and rehabilitation. He 
brought suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin the NBME from annotating 
his scores to reflect that he received testing 
accommodations. By consent of the parties, Doe's motion 
for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the NBME from 
annotating his scores was assigned to a Magistrate Judge 
(hereafter the District Court). After a three-day hearing, the 
District Court granted the motion, holding that Doe had 
standing to sue, that he had demonstrated a reasonable 
likelihood of success on his claim that annotating his 
scores violated section 302 of the ADA, and that he had 
demonstrated that he would be irreparably harmed absent 
an injunction. This expedited appeal followed (Doe must 
send his scores to the residency programs soon if he is to 
be seriously considered in the matching process that will 
take place in early 2000). 
 
The critical questions on appeal are (1) whether Doe has 
standing to sue; (2) what section of Title III of the ADA 
governs Doe's claim; (3) whether the very act of annotating 
Doe's scores violates the ADA; and (4) whether Doe has 
proven that the additional time did not affect the 
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comparability of his scores to non-accommodated scores, 
and thus that the flag imposes an inequality on him. We 
conclude that, although flagging sufficiently injures Doe to 
surmount the NBME's argument that Doe lacks standing to 
sue, flagging does not constitute an ipso facto violation of 
Title III of the ADA. In so doing, we conclude that section 
309 of Title III, 42 U.S.C. 12189 (19__), the section 
specifically governing examinations, and not section 302, 
42 U.S.C. 12182 (19__) the general provision on 
discrimination in public accommodations, controls this case.1 
 
We also conclude that, in order to demonstrate a 
reasonable likelihood of success on his claim under section 
309, Doe bore the burden of showing that his scores were 
comparable to non-accommodated scores in terms of 
predicting his future success, and that he failed to meet 
this burden. The District Court's conclusion that Doe had 
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on his 
claims under Title III of the ADA thus was unsupported by 
the evidence Doe presented and the factual conclusions the 
Court reached. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court 
abused its discretion in determining that Doe had shown a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and we 
vacate the order granting the preliminary injunction. 
 
I. Facts & Procedural History 
 
The NBME, together with the Federation of State Medical 
Boards of the United States, Inc., offers the USMLE. The 
USMLE is a standardized multiple-choice test administered 
in three parts, or "Steps". The USMLE was designed as a 
licensing exam meant to assess an examinee's 
understanding of, and ability to apply, concepts and 
principles that are important in health and disease and 
constitute the basis of safe and effective patient care. In 
order to obtain a license to practice medicine in the United 
States, an examinee must obtain a passing score on all 
three Steps of the USMLE. Prior to May 1999, the USMLE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As the District Court applied section 302, we also briefly consider 
whether the general requirements in section 302 unsettle our conclusion 
that Doe has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits and conclude that they do not. 
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was provided in a written format. Since May 1999, the 
USMLE has been given in a computerized format. After an 
examinee takes the USMLE, the NBME sends a score report 
to the examinee. Although the USMLE was designed for use 
as a licensing exam, it is common practice for residency 
and fellowship programs to use USMLE test scores in 
evaluating candidates for admission to their programs. At 
an examinee's request, the NBME will send a USMLE score 
transcript to third parties designated by the examinee, 
including residency and internship programs and state 
licensing authorities. 
 
When examinees with disabilities apply to take the 
USMLE, they can request that the NBME provide testing 
accommodations. An examinee must support such a 
request with evidence that he is disabled and that a 
particular accommodation is an appropriate 
accommodation for his disability. Examples of 
accommodations that the NBME has provided in the past 
include large type, assistance filling in answer sheets, and 
extra time. 
 
When an examinee is granted a testing accommodation of 
extra time, the NBME flags the examinee's transcript of 
scores with the statement "Testing Accommodations" on the 
front of the transcript and a comment on the back of the 
transcript stating: "Following review and approval of a 
request from the examinee, testing accommodations were 
provided in the administration of the examination." The 
NBME flags only those testing accommodations that its 
experts conclude may affect the validity of a score. For 
example, an accommodation providing a test in large print 
would not be flagged. The NBME flags scores obtained 
under extra time accommodations because its 
psychometricians have concluded that scores obtained with 
extra time accommodations may not be comparable to 
scores obtained under standardized conditions.2 In such 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. According to the testimony of one of the experts, psychometrics is "a 
sub-discipline within quantitative psychology, that looks at testing and-- 
the usefulness of tests, generally and other predictive variables. [ ] 
Psychometrics, generally, includes the techniques that are used to build 
tests and then evaluate those tests, once built." 
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circumstances, according to the NBME, the extra time may 
under- or overcompensate for the test-taker's disability. 
 
John Doe currently is a fourth-year medical student at 
the Medical College of Virginia. He was diagnosed with 
multiple sclerosis in the summer of 1987, when he was in 
college. Doe's condition causes muscular spasticity,fine 
motor problems, urgency of the bowel and bladder, and 
occasional incontinence. Doe does not have any learning 
disabilities, and his multiple sclerosis does not affect his 
cognitive abilities. The type, frequency, and duration of 
symptoms that Doe experiences vary and are unpredictable. 
The parties agree that Doe is disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA. 
 
When Doe applied to the NBME to take Step 1 of the 
USMLE, he completed a NBME questionnaire in order to 
request testing accommodations. On that questionnaire, 
Doe informed the NBME that he had a physical disability. 
After several communications between the NBME and Doe 
in which Doe refused lesser accommodations, the NBME 
provided the following accommodations for Doe's Step 1 
examination: (1) time and one half to take the examination; 
and (2) a special seating assignment close to the restroom. 
Doe requested these accommodations because his condition 
can require him to stop and stretch his muscles frequently, 
taking many "micro-breaks," and to visit the restroom 
often. Doe concedes that it is possible for him to continue 
considering questions on the exam while he takes these 
breaks. 
 
Doe's score report for Step 1 of the USMLE contained an 
annotation that Doe received testing accommodations for 
the examination. After he received the scores, Doe wrote to 
the NBME and requested that it remove the annotation 
from his scores. The NBME denied Doe's request. When 
Doe applied to take Step 2 of the USMLE, he again 
requested testing accommodations from the NBME. 
Although Doe only requested time and a half for Step 2, the 
NBME provided Doe with double time. It did so because the 
computerized version of the test, which is the version of 
Step 2 Doe was applying to take, is designed so that the 
only available extra time accommodation is double time. 
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The NBME expects to report Doe's Step 2 scores sometime 
in December of this year. 
 
Doe has sent flagged Step 1 scores to some, but not all, 
of the physical medicine and rehabilitation residency and 
internship programs to which he is applying. He has been 
offered interviews at some of the programs to which he 
applied, which review applications and make decisions 
regarding interviews on a rolling basis. 
 
A flagged score effectively indicates to anyone familiar 
with the NBME's policies regarding flagging that the 
examinee has a disability of some sort, because only 
disabled people receive testing accommodations. The NBME 
will respond to inquiries from third parties who have 
received annotated scores regarding the nature of the 
accommodation provided, but it will not release information 
regarding the disability for which the accommodation was 
given. In Doe's case, it would inform residency and 
internship programs who made inquiries about theflag that 
Doe received extra time on his examinations, but it would 
not reveal to the programs that Doe has multiple sclerosis. 
 
The District Court found that the NBME had not shown 
that it must flag the scores of accommodated examinees in 
order to secure the psychometric soundness of the USMLE. 
Significantly, however, the Court declined to conclude 
whether it is possible to determine psychometrically if the 
score of a candidate who received an accommodation of 
extra time is better than, worse than, or the same as the 
same score for a candidate who took the exam under 
standardized conditions. 
 
Tests vary along a continuum in the extent to which they 
are "power" or "speeded" tests. A purely power test 
measures an examinee's knowledge of the subject of the 
exam with no time constraints. A purely speeded test 
measures the time in which an examinee can complete 
ministerial tasks. The USMLE exams are primarily power 
tests, but they have a speeded component as well. Some 
25% of examinees have reported that they felt that they 
could have benefitted from more time on the examination. 
There was conflicting expert testimony regarding the 
comparability of time-accommodated scores to scores 
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achieved under standard conditions. The NBME's experts 
testified to a lack of evidence of comparability. For example, 
Dr. Mehrens testified that "[a]lthough research has 
suggested that accommodated scores tend to overpredict 
[success], research has certainly not informed us regarding 
the exact probability" of error in comparing accommodated 
and non-accommodated test scores. Doe's expert, Dr. 
Geisinger, testified that providing extra time to individuals 
with disabilities leads to results comparable to tests taken 
under standard conditions; he acknowledged, however, that 
it would be difficult to determine whether Doe received any 
advantage from the extra time accommodation. As noted 
above, the District Court declined to make a finding of 
comparability on this evidence. 
 
Doe believes that he will be discriminated against by 
residency and internship programs if he submits flagged 
scores. He testified at the preliminary injunction hearing, 
however, that he did not know whether individuals at the 
programs to which he had applied had any concerns about 
admitting persons with disabilities. He also testified that he 
had not been told that he would be denied admission to 
any program because of the annotation or because of his 
disability. 
 
Pressed at oral argument to identify evidence supporting 
Doe's belief, Doe's counsel offered three bases in support of 
the assertion that the programs to which Doe has applied 
will discriminate against him. First, he offered Doe's own 
experience. In 1988, Doe took admission examinations for 
both medical school and law school. He was accepted to 
one of the two medical schools to which he applied as well 
as to law school, and he decided on the law. After 
completing law school and practicing law with prestigious 
law firms for five years, he decided to reapply to medical 
school. The second time around, he applied over the course 
of two years and was accepted to only one of the thirty-two 
medical schools to which he applied. 
 
Doe argues that the comparison between his experience 
applying to medical school directly from college, where his 
scores on the medical school admissions exam were not 
flagged and he was accepted at 1 of the 2 schools to which 
he applied, and his experience applying to medical school 
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after practicing law for several years, where his scores were 
flagged and he was accepted to 1 of the 32 schools to which 
he applied, is evidence that residency and internship 
programs will discriminate against him. He did not, 
however, present any evidence of the relative selectivity of 
the schools to which he applied the first and the second 
time (which could explain the result), or evidence regarding 
his grades and tests scores as compared to other applicants 
against whom he was competing the first and second time 
he applied, or evidence that his success rate was lower the 
second time he applied because of the flag rather than as 
a result of some other factor--such as the possibility that 
he was a less attractive candidate for medical school the 
second time because he had practiced law for five years. He 
also did not present any evidence that residency and 
internship programs would be likely to respond to his 
application the same way that medical schools responded. 
 
Second, Doe's counsel cited testimony by Dr. Geisinger, 
Doe's expert, that he believed that some programs might 
discriminate against Doe on the basis of his disability. More 
specifically, Dr. Geisinger stated that he believed some 
small programs might discriminate against disabled 
candidates because of the potential cost of accommodating 
a disabled resident, citing a study by Warren W. 
Willingham on the testing of handicapped people. After 
offering this opinion, however, Dr. Geisinger was asked "but 
there's no research that supports anything you just said, is 
there?" He replied "I would say there is no empirical 
research." 
 
Third, Doe's counsel cited the Willingham study referred 
to by Dr. Geisinger. But the Willingham study, which did 
not involve the USMLE, is equivocal. It states both that 
"overall the selection process for handicapped applicants 
was comparable to that for the nonhandicapped in the 
sense that decisions followed quite closely what one would 
expect from HSG and SAT scores" and that "admissions 
were lower than predicted for a relatively small number of 
visually impaired and physically handicapped students 
applying to smaller institutions." 
 
The NBME opposed Doe's motion for a preliminary 
injunction by arguing that Doe lacked standing and that he 
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had not met the requirements for a preliminary injunction. 
The NBME also argued that the court should recognize a 
communicatory privilege protecting its good faith 
communications to users of USMLE scores. 
 
The District Court held that Doe had standing to sue the 
NBME, that he had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of 
showing that the practice of flagging violated his rights 
under the ADA, and that he had demonstrated that he 
would be irreparably harmed absent an injunction. It 
granted Doe's motion, enjoining the NBME from annotating 
or flagging Doe's scores on Step 1 and Step 2 of the 
USMLE. The NBME appeals from the order granting the 
preliminary injunction. 
 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636(c) (19__), an aggrieved party 
to a matter heard by a magistrate by consent of the parties 
"may appeal directly to the appropriate United States court 
of appeals from the judgment of the magistrate in the same 
manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district 
court." This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1) (19__), which confers jurisdiction on the Courts 
of Appeals to hear appeals from interlocutory orders 
granting injunctions. 
 
II. Standing  
 
The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" has 
three parts: injury in fact (a concrete harm suffered by the 
plaintiff that is actual or imminent), causation, and 
redressibility. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992). Because these requirements are not 
pleading requirements, but are necessary elements of a 
plaintiff's case, mere allegations will not support standing 
at the preliminary injunction stage. "[E]ach element [of 
standing] must be supported in the same way as any other 
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e. 
with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 
successive stages of litigation." Id. at 561. Doe has not 
adduced evidence demonstrating more than a mere 
possibility that he will be discriminated against by 
residency and internship programs if his scores are flagged. 
Accordingly, Doe has not demonstrated standing on this 
basis. 
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The District Court concluded that Doe had standing 
because he "pled infringement of the right to be free from 
discrimination under the [ADA]." This formulation of 
standing ignores the requirement that, at the preliminary 
injunction stage, allegations are not enough to support 
standing, and it incorrectly equates a violation of a statute 
with an injury sufficient to confer standing. The proper 
analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff 
suffered an actual injury, not on whether a statute was 
violated. Although Congress can expand standing by 
enacting a law enabling someone to sue on what was 
already a de facto injury to that person, it cannot confer 
standing by statute alone. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 
(noting that Congress can "elevat[e] to the status of a legally 
cognizable injur[y] concrete, de facto injuries that were 
previously inadequate in law."). 
 
Doe has identified, however, an injury in fact that 
provides an alternative basis for standing. He has 
demonstrated that the flag on his test scores identifies him 
as a disabled person. Being so identified harms him in the 
sense that, because of his justifiable and reasonable 
concern as a disabled person with how people who can 
affect his future and his livelihood, and whose judgment 
may be informed by the information, will perceive him, he 
has actively sought to avoid being so identified. We are 
persuaded that this injury--being identified as a disabled 
person against his will--is enough to establish that Doe has 
suffered a concrete harm as a result of the NBME's policy 
of flagging accommodated scores. 
 
The jurisprudence of standing is littered with cases in 
which courts have dismissed actions because the injury 
was not personal (i.e., it accrued to third parties), or the 
injury was not concrete (i.e., it was too theoretical), or the 
injury was not actual or imminent (i.e., it was speculative), 
but that is not the case here. The injury identified is 
personal to Doe; he is not claiming an injury from 
generalized discrimination against disabled persons or 
suing on behalf of the disabled, he is claiming that it hurts 
him personally to be identified as a disabled person when 
he has explicitly stated that he does not want to be so 
identified. If his fear of discrimination were unfounded, we 
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might call this a purely theoretical injury (i.e., one that is 
not concrete). But because his fear is based in reality, Doe's 
injury to his interest in keeping his disability private is 
concrete. Similarly, the injury is actual/ imminent. Some of 
his score reports already have been flagged, and the others 
are sure to be flagged absent an injunction. Thus, we 
conclude that Doe has met the actual injury component of 
the constitutional standing requirement. 
 
Because the injury complained of is an injury fairly 
traceable to the NBME that would be redressed by the relief 
Doe seeks, we conclude that Doe has met the constitutional 
standing requirement.3 This conclusion, however, is 
analytically separate from the question whetherflagging in 
these circumstances constitutes discrimination under Title 
III of the ADA, to which we now turn. 
 
III. The Preliminary Injunction 
 
A. General Standards 
 
This Court reviews orders granting preliminary 
injunctions for abuse of discretion. We review underlying 
findings of fact for clear error and consider questions of law 
de novo. See Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 
652 (3d Cir. 1994). A court abuses its discretion when its 
ruling is founded on an error of law or a misapplication of 
law to the facts. See Marco v. Accent Pub. Co., 969 F.2d 
1547, 1548 (3d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, inasmuch as the 
result depends upon a question of law, namely, whether the 
practice of flagging test scores violates the Americans with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The NBME adduced some evidence that, if Doe is interviewed by a 
physician in the residency and internship programs, the physician would 
be able to tell from Doe's gait that he has some sort of neurological 
disorder. Doe has contested this evidence on the basis that he has 
successfully hid his disability in medical school. We are not persuaded 
that the NBME's evidence shows that Doe's injury would not be 
redressed by the relief he seeks. If programs that interview Doe are able 
to identify him as a disabled person on the basis of the interview, such 
would occur only after Doe already had been granted an interview. An 
annotation on his test score, by contrast, allows programs to identify 
Doe as a disabled person before they decide whether to interview him. 
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Disabilities Act, we exercise plenary review. See In re Assets 
of Myles Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1357 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
"Four factors govern a district court's decision whether to 
issue a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has 
shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) 
whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of 
the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result 
in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) 
whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public 
interest." American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. 
Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). If the order granting the 
preliminary injunction is to be upheld, Doe must 
demonstrate that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding both that he had a reasonable 
probability of success on his claim that flagging his score 
violates the ADA, and that he would be irreparably harmed 
if an injunction did not issue. As we hold that Doe has not 
demonstrated a reasonable chance of success on his claim 
that flagging his scores violates the ADA, we vacate the 
order granting a preliminary injunction without reaching 
the question of irreparable harm.4 
 
B. The Specific Controls the General 
 
The District Court analyzed the "flag" under section 302 
of the ADA, which sets forth general provisions prohibiting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The NBME also argues that this Court should recognize a common law 
privilege that would protect good faith, truthful communications to state 
licensing authorities and medical residency programs. Such a privilege 
would be a defense to this suit, as with communicatory privileges within 
the law of defamation. Because of the public interest in ensuring that 
physicians are qualified to practice medicine, the NBME claims a duty to 
disclose the manner in which the USMLE was administered and the 
meaning of the resulting score. In support of this proposition, the NBME 
cites Rothman v. Emory University, 123 F.3d 446, 452 n.4 (7th Cir. 
1997), in which the court, although deciding the case on other grounds, 
observed that a claim that a law school dean's communications to state 
bar examiners were protected by a common law privilege grounded in the 
public interest in an applicant's moral character, reputation, and fitness 
for the practice of law had "exceptional force." Because Doe has not met 
his burden of showing a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, 
we need not consider the NBME's invitation to recognize such a privilege. 
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discrimination in public accommodations, 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182 (19__). It failed to consider whether section 309, 
the more specific statute governing discrimination by 
providers of examinations, effectively defines the 
requirements of Title III of the ADA with regard to  
examinations.5 
 
In reviewing this decision, we begin with the ordinary 
tools of statutory construction. "[I]t is a commonplace of 
statutory construction that the specific governs the 
general." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 
374, 384 (1992) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, 
Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987)); see also Fourco Glass Co. 
v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957) 
("The law is settled that however inclusive may be the 
general language of a statute, it will not be held to apply to 
a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same 
enactment.") (citations omitted). This principle has special 
force when Congress has targeted specific problems with 
specific solutions in the context of a general statute. See 
HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (per 
curiam). It applies "particularly when the two[provisions] 
are interrelated and closely positioned, both in fact being 
parts of" the same statutory scheme. See HCSC-Laundry, 
450 U.S. at 6. But see Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 
511 (1996) (rejecting argument that specific limitation on 
remedies in one provision of a statute trumped a general 
provision for remedies in another section).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Doe also makes a claim under Title V of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Section 503, 42 U.S.C. S 12203 (19__). Title V prohibits 
retaliation and coercion directed at persons who have taken steps to 
oppose an act or practice or who have made a charge of illegality under 
the ADA. Because the record reflects no evidence of retaliation or 
coercion, we hold that Doe has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood 
of success on his Title V claim. 
 
6. For the purposes of applying the "specific governs the general" canon 
of construction, it is important to distinguish between arguments 
regarding simultaneously enacted provisions of the same act, where the 
Supreme Court has found the canon to be a useful interpretive guide 
even absent a conflict between the provisions, and arguments for implied 
repeal, where the Supreme Court has sometimes found the canon to 
have force only when there is a "positive repugnancy" between two 
different statutes. See Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253 (1992) (quoting Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 
363 (1842)). 
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An analogous case suggests that the District Court erred 
in analyzing the case under section 302 instead of section 
309. In HCSC-Laundry, a cooperative laundry formed by a 
group of hospitals challenged a ruling of the Internal 
Revenue Service. The service denied the laundry not-for- 
profit status under the general provisions regarding not-for- 
profit organizations of section 501 of the Tax Code, because 
a more specific provision under 501 governed the not-for- 
profit status of hospitals, and the laundry did not fit within 
that provision. In holding that the laundry could not claim 
not-for-profit status under the general provision, it was 
significant to the Court that both provisions were"parts of 
501 relating to exemption of organizations from tax." 450 
U.S. at 6. 
 
Here, by analogy, both 309 and 302 are parts of Title III, 
which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations. 
We believe that the rationale of the "specific governs the 
general" canon counsels that we treat section 309 as 
Congress's specific definition of what Title III requires in the 
context of examinations. Moreover, although applying 
section 302 would not necessarily undermine limitations 
created by section 309 (neither section explicitly mentions 
flagging), it would render 309 superfluous. If section 302 
settled the question, there would have been no need to 
enact section 309. Accordingly, we conclude that section 
309 governs in this case. 
 
C. Section 309 
 
Section 309 does not explicitly bar the practice offlagging 
the test scores of examinees who have received testing 
accommodations. It provides that "[a]ny person that offers 
examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, 
certification, or credentialing for secondary or post- 
secondary education, professional, or trade purposes shall 
offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner 
accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative 
accessible arrangements for such individuals." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12189 (19__). The NBME concedes that this provision 
required it to accommodate Doe's disability when he took 
the exam. It argues, however, that it is not required to keep 
the provision of an accommodation secret from programs 
that use USMLE scores to evaluate candidates. 
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While the Department of Justice regulations interpreting 
section 309 provide a useful explication of its meaning, they 
also make no explicit mention of the practice of flagging 
accommodations. They interpret the section to require that 
 
       [t]he examination is selected and administered so as to 
       best ensure that, when the examination is 
       administered to an individual with a disability that 
       impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the 
       examination results accurately reflect the individual's 
       aptitude or achievement level or whatever other factor 
       the examination purports to measure, rather than 
       reflecting the individual's impaired sensory, manual, or 
       speaking skills (except where those skills are the 
       factors that the examination purports to measure)." 28 
       C.F.R. S 36.309(b)(1)(i) (19__). 
 
Because he cannot point to an explicit bar on the 
practice of flagging, Doe argues that the annotation unfairly 
calls into question the validity of his scores and in effect 
denies him the opportunity to take the exam "in a place 
and manner accessible" to him. Doe reads too much into 
the phrase "in a [ ] manner accessible to persons with 
disabilities." He would have us hold that the phrase "in a 
manner accessible" includes by implication the requirement 
that the resulting scores be declared psychometrically 
comparable to the scores of examinees who take the test 
under standard conditions. However, neither the language 
of the statute nor the regulation interpreting it sets forth or 
implies such a requirement. 
 
The term "accessible" is not best understood to mean 
"exactly comparable." The notion of accessibility, or best 
ensuring that examination results accurately reflect 
"aptitude or achievement level," see 28 C.F.R. 
S 36.309(b)(1)(i), does not mandate that the NBME provide 
examinations to the disabled that yield technically equal 
results; it mandates changes to examinations--"alternative 
accessible arrangements," 42 U.S.C. S 12189 (19__)--so 
that disabled people who are disadvantaged by certain 
features of standardized examinations may take the 
examinations without those features that disadvantage 
them. 
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This is not a case in which the NBME refused to provide 
Doe with a score. The annotation does not state that Doe's 
scores are invalid. Moreover, Doe has not adduced evidence 
that residency and internship programs would regard the 
annotation as a signal of invalidity. As the evidence 
described supra at pages 7-8 reflects, he also has not 
proven that his scores are comparable to non- 
accommodated scores, and thus that, by flagging, the 
NBME has imposed an inequality on him by treating the 
same thing differently. Indeed, the District Court explicitly 
refused to conclude that the Doe's scores are comparable: 
"the larger issue of whether, in fact, standardized scores 
and scores obtained by disabled individuals for whom time- 
related accommodations were granted are comparable in 
psychometric terms . . . need not be answered by me." Doe 
v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 1999 WL 997141, 
at *12. The expert testimony was unanimous that it is not 
possible to know how scores of exams taken with 
accommodations compare to scores of exams taken under 
standard conditions. The annotation simply indicates that 
Doe's scores are not psychometrically comparable to the 
scores of examinees who took the test without 
accommodations. 
 
In the absence of a statutory proscription against 
annotating the test scores of examinees who receive 
accommodations, we do not view the annotation on Doe's 
score--or its implications as just described--as itself 
constituting a denial of access. If Doe were to establish 
either that his scores are psychometrically comparable to 
the scores of candidates who take the test under standard 
time conditions, or that his scores will be ignored by the 
programs to which they are reported, he might have 
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on this 
claim. He has not met these evidentiary burdens. It may be 
that Doe will be able to develop a fuller record atfinal 
hearing. On the current record, however, he has not shown 
a reasonable likelihood that he will prevail. 
 
D. Section 302 
 
Although we have concluded that section 309 defines the 
requirements of the Title III of the ADA as applied to 
examinations, we also note that nothing in section 302, the 
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section under which the case was decided by the District 
Court, gives us reason to believe that Doe would have 
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success under 
section 302 if it were the appropriate section to apply. 
Section 302 provides that "[N]o individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of 
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or 
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 
U.S.C. S 12182 (19__). Our cases construing section 302 
hold that "[t]he plain meaning of Title III is that a public 
accommodation is a place, leading to the conclusion that 
`[i]t is all of the services which the public accommodation 
offers, not all of the services which the lessor of the public 
accommodation offers[,] which falls within the scope of Title 
III.' " See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612- 
13 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial 
Medical Center 154 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1998) ("We look 
for . . . some nexus between the services or privileges 
denied and the physical place of the . . . public 
accommodation."). 
 
Assuming that the service of reporting a score is bundled 
with the service of offering the examination and thus has 
the requisite direct nexus to a public accommodation, we 
do not believe that Doe has demonstrated a reasonable 
likelihood of showing that this service has been provided to 
him in a manner that is discriminatory or unequal under 
the terms of Title III.7 The District Court held that Doe had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The NBME does not argue that the examination itself is not a public 
accommodation within the meaning of the statute, but argues that there 
is no direct nexus between the examination and the score report. Doe 
counters that the score is bundled together as a service with the exam 
itself, because no one would take the exam except to obtain a score, and 
thus that the requisite direct nexus is present. This is a forceful 
argument. Because, however, the USMLE was designed as a physician 
licensing examination to provide state medical boards with a uniform 
basis for measuring the qualifications of applicants seeking to be 
licensed as physicians, we believe that the question whether scores 
reported to residency and internship programs are a service bundled 
with the examination and thus have the requisite direct nexus to come 
within the definition of public accommodations under section 302 is 
close, but resolving the question would not affect the outcome here. 
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demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of successfully 
showing that flagging violates the general prohibition on 
discrimination in section 302, on the theory that the NBME 
provided Doe a service unequal to the service offered to 
other test takers. We reject this conclusion for the same 
reason that we rejected Doe's argument under section 309: 
Doe has not demonstrated that flagging his score makes 
the service that the NBME provided to him substantively 
unequal to the service it provides to other examinees. Like 
other examinees, Doe took the exam and received a score. 
Doe has not demonstrated that his score is comparable to 
the scores of candidates who take the exam under standard 
conditions and thus that flagging his score imposes an 
inequality on him.8 
 
Doe's final argument under section 302 is that identifying 
him as a disabled person violates the general prohibition on 
discrimination in section 302 because it facilitates 
discrimination against him by third parties, namely, 
residency and internship programs. There are several 
difficulties with this argument. First, there is no provision 
of Title III that explicitly requires confidentiality from 
providers of public accommodation. By way of contrast, 
Title I of the ADA, regarding disabilities and the 
employment relationship, does require employers to protect 
the confidentiality of their employees with disabilities, with 
certain specific exceptions. See 42 U.S.C.SS 12112(d)(3)(B), 
(4)(C) (19__). Second, if residency and internship programs 
were to discriminate against Doe as a result of his 
disability, such discrimination would not necessarily be 
attributable to the NBME. Finally, as noted above, Doe has 
not established that he is likely to suffer discrimination at 
the hands of residency and internship programs as a result 
of an annotation to his scores. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In addition to the general prohibition on discrimination, section 302 
sets forth five subsections containing "specific prohibitions" on 
discrimination in public accommodations. These subsections are largely 
inapposite, and none does anything to undermine our conclusion that 
Doe has not demonstrated a likelihood that he would prevail on a section 
302 claim if we were to determine that section 302 were the correct 
section under which to analyze his claim. 
 





For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court 
granting a preliminary injunction will be vacated. The 
parties shall bear their own costs. 
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